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This study investigates the effect of trade liberalization on export growth, import 
growth, the trade balance and the current account of the balance of payments in 17 least 
developed countries (LDCs) over the period 1970 to 2001. The paper also assesses the 
marginal relation between capital flows (e.g., aid flows) and import growth, and the 
trade balance and the current account of the balance of payments. The higher import 
growth contrasts with the more modest export growth following trade liberalization and 
this has fundamental policy implications, especially for the balance of trade and the 
balance of payments. However, the financing and sustainability of the trade deficit in 
the reforming countries will depend not only on the outcome of trade liberalization, but 
also on other macroeconomic policies, developments in the real exchange rate and the 
inflows of foreign capital.  
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1 Introduction 
Advanced countries and international financial and development organizations have 
poured financial assistance in the form of loans, grants, and technical support to the less 
developed countries, with the aim of spurring economic growth and reducing poverty. 
Effective aid is seen as the foremost tool to achieve internationally agreed development 
targets (e.g., Millennium Development Goals), and to arrest economic atrophy in the 
poorest regions, particularly in Africa and Asia, where the majority of least developed 
countries (LDCs) are found.1  
However, multilateral and bilateral financial assistance is still a contentious issue. Some 
academics and policymakers argue that aid failed to reduce poverty and, furthermore, 
attaching conditionality to aid did not lead to policy changes. Moreover, domestic 
political factors such as macroeconomic environment, secure property rights, effective 
rule of law, and delivery of critical social services are seen as primary determinants of 
policy changes rather than aid on its own (Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren 2001).2 For 
instance, Collier and Dollar (2001) develop a model in which aid flows respond to 
policy improvements, thus establishing a better background for poverty reduction and 
effective aid allocation. Another concern is that the resources tendered are inadequate 
relative to the goals, and that western donors fall short of the UN target of delivering 0.7 
per cent of GDP in aid (Besley and Burgess 2003: 1). Therefore, ‘even effectively 
targeted aid is unlikely to yield a solution without a considerable change in the global 
political climate’. 
This study examines the effect of liberalization on export growth and import growth, 
and on the trade balance and current account of the balance of payments in 17 LDCs, 
also classified as fragile states,3 over the period 1970 to 2001. Trade liberalization is 
assumed to improve a country’s performance by promoting domestic economic 
                                                 
1   The LDC are defined by the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council as low-income countries 
that are suffering from long-term handicaps to growth, in particular low levels of human resource 
development and/or severe structural weaknesses. The following criteria are used for determining the 
LDC status, as proposed by the Committee for Development Policy:  
(i)  a low-income criterion, based on a three-year average estimate of the gross domestic product 
per capita (under US$900 for inclusion, above US$1,035 for graduation) 
(ii)  A human resource weakness criterion, involving a composite augmented physical quality of 
life index (APQLI) based on indicators of nutrition; health; education; adult literacy.  
(iii)  An economic vulnerability criterion, involving a composite economic vulnerability index 
(EVI) based on indicators of: the instability of agricultural production; the instability of 
exports of goods and services; the economic importance of non-traditional activities (share of 
manufacturing and modern services in GDP); merchandise export concentration; the 
handicap of economic smallness (as measured through the population in logarithm). 
2  However, there authors provide examples of African economies that have successfully liberalized 
under structural adjustment programmes. This issue will be discussed later. 
3   The LDC countries studied in this paper are also categorized as fragile states under the World Bank’s 
country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA). The CPIA ranks countries according to 16 criteria 
grouped in four groups: (i) economic management; (ii) structural policies; (iii) policies for social 
inclusion and equity; and (iv) public sector management and institutions. The countries’ standings in 
this classification will affect the pattern of financial assistance from major development funding 
institutions (e.g., those under the International Development Association umbrella).   2
efficiency and by encouraging trade flows between nations.4 However, the literature on 
trade liberalization has hitherto focused on the beneficial effects of liberalization 
episodes by using mainly supply-side growth models, overlooking the effects on the 
balance of payments.5  
The paper also assesses the marginal relationship between capital flows (i.e., aid flows) 
and import growth, and the trade balance and the current account of the balance of 
payments. Trade liberalization by developing and least developed countries in recent 
decades has been undertaken both in the context of multilateral trade negotiations, and as 
part of the conditionality linked to structural adjustment and stabilization programmes 
agreed with the IMF and the World Bank.6 This conditionality justifies the need of 
analysing the links between the liberalization commitments and financial resources 
inflows. Also, official development assistance remains the most important source of 
foreign capital in poor countries, amounting to more than 20 per cent of imports, and 10 
per cent of GDP. 
Some studies have also analysed the causality between aid flows and trade, and vice 
versa. McGillivray and Morrissey (1998) suggest that aid may induce donor exports either 
because: (i) of the general economic effects on the recipient, (ii) aid is directly linked to 
trade, or (iii) aid reinforces bilateral economic and political links, or (iv) a combination of 
the three factors. Similarly, the view that trade can lead to aid is often attributed to the 
effects of donors’ aid allocation policies. Also, trade can lead to aid depending on the 
commercial links between the donor and the recipient country (which could engender 
trade dependency). The authors show that there is a relationship between aid and trade but 
that the specific nature of this relationship can vary between donor-recipient pairs. Lloyd 
et al. (2000) produce similar conclusions.7 
Moreover, not only aid flows but the volatility of such flows has serious implications for 
the recipient country’s domestic activity, particularly in highly aid-dependent countries 
such as LDC (Bulίř and Hamnn 2003). Also, programme aid inflows are regarded as 
paramount for the financing and sustainability of reforms, and for funding balance of 
payments deficits. White and Dijkstra (2003) show that capital inflows (i.e., programme 
aid)8 would ultimately contribute to boost economic growth and hence reduce poverty. 
The authors also stress the marginal direct impact on the external accounts.  
                                                 
4  See Romer (1994); Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Krueger (1998). 
5   Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004) analyse the effect of trade liberalization on exports, imports and 
the balance of payments for a sample of developing and LDCs that have also liberalized in the context 
of structural adjustment and/or multilateral trade commitments. However, the authors do not assess 
the impact of foreign capital or aid, or how financial inflows might be influenced by the liberalization 
process.  
6    The LDCs began to receive core financing in the mid-1980s by the IMF’s structural adjustment 
facility (SAF) in March 1986, which was extended in 1987 to the enhanced structural adjustment 
facility (ESAF) (see IMF 1998). In 1999 the ESAF was transformed into the poverty reduction and 
growth facility (PRGF) which since then conduct policy change, debt relief, and financing in low 
income countries. 
7   See also Morrissey (2006). 
8  Programme aid is defined as ‘Programme assistance consists of all contributions made available to a 
recipient country for general and development purposes i.e., balance of payments support, general   3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses trade policy reforms in 
LDCs. Section 3 looks at the relationship between trade liberalization and export 
performance, and the effects of trade liberalization and aid on import growth. Section 4 
analyses the impact of trade liberalization and aid on the trade balance and the current 
account of the balance of payments. Section 5 discusses policy implications and concludes. 
2  Trade policy reforms in LDCS 
From the early 1980s many least developed countries (LDCs) adopted multi-year 
structural adjustment programmes (SAP) to address existing macroeconomic struggles, 
and trade reforms were a key in such programmes. Improvements were achieved in the 
areas of inflation, and notably on balance of payments and fiscal balances, but at the 
expense of taxing international indebtedness, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).9 
Belshaw and Livingstone (2002) show that by the end of the 1990s, half a dozen 
countries had large government budget deficits and at least thirteen countries showed 
negative current trade balances in excess of 40 per cent of current exports. The greater 
part of such countries are LDCs. 
In the context of the global phenomenon of trade liberalization, LDCs have evidenced 
significant commitment towards policy reforms, in spite of problems of implementation 
and disruptions (see Morrissey 2002 and UNCTAD 2002). Tables 1A and 1B present 
the dating of trade liberalization in LDCs, and the average duty change before and after 
the liberalization episodes. The quantifiable reduction in average tariffs in most LDCs is 
also reported in Table 2. Table A2 also shows the changes in trade policy restrictiveness 
(i.e., the changes in tariff and non-tariff barriers), which are noteworthy if compared 
with other developing countries. 
The reforms in LDCs involved, as in other developing economies, major changes in 
industrial policies and the protection structures, and some of these reforms were 
implemented as early as 1980s. The most common factors of trade liberalization in the 
majority of the countries embrace (see Musonda and Adam 1999; Rodrik 1997 and 
Morrissey 2002):10 
i)  reduction of tariffs and rationalization of tariff structures, including the introduction 
of new structures based on MFN (most favoured nation) rates, and zero or special 
rates based on bilateral and regional trade agreements; and  
ii)  gradual elimination of quantitative restrictions and prohibitions.  
                                                                                                                                               
budget support and commodity assistance, not linked to specific project activities’ White and Dijkstra 
(2003: 17) (quoted by the authors from OECD 1991: 5). 
9  Debt accumulation is related to the poor use of aid inflows, including well-known factors such as 
political clientelism, imposition of penalties by donor agencies, lobby or pressure groups, etc. An 
exhaustive analysis of aid fungibility, aid flows, or aid’s impact in economic performance is beyond 
the purposes of this paper. For a detailed analysis of aid effectiveness to Africa, refer, for example to 
Kanbur (2000) and Addison, Mavrotas and McGillivray (2005). 
10 In the present case the date of liberalization coincides with the liberalization episodes described in 
Tables 1A and 1B, or the second liberalization attempt. Also, Borgatti (2003) presents an exhaustive 
analysis of the LDCs’ trade policy regimes. See also Table A1.   4
Table 1A 
Export growth and duty change before and after liberalization episodes  
  Liberalization:  Before liberalization  After liberalization 
Country  1st attempt  Episodes  Export growth  Export duty Export growth  Export duty
            
Bangladesh 1986  1992-present 6.69  4.50    10.94  0.0 
Benin 1988  1990-94  8.25 2.43   2.62  0.0 
Burundi 2002  2002  present  6.70  15.46    16.90  0.03 
Gambia, The  1985  1985-88 6.48  4.65    1.09  1.22 
Guinea 1986  1985-87  –  –   4.62  16.03 
Lesotho 1984 1994-99  8.89 5.92   8.87  0.0 
Madagascar 1988  1988-96  3.02  5.00    6.14  0.17 
Malawi 1988  1997-2001  4.94  0.48    2.75  0.0 
Mauritania 1992  1992-97 10.51  0.48    1.67  0.0 
Mozambique 1987  1992-93  -14.39  –    11.32  0.0 
Nepal 1986  1986-92  10.41  3.36    9.68 1.17 
Senegal 1986 1994-present 2.86  1.89    4.33  0.0 
Sudan 1992  1996-2000  -0.65 60.69    6.05  0.67 
Tanzania 1984  1990-present –  6.28    9.07  0.0 
Togo 1988  1988-96  11.17 1.96   0.05  0.0 
Uganda 1981  1991-96  1.96  35.21    11.51  0.02 
Zambia 1982  1992-95  0.02 2.65   3.39  0.0 
Source:   Liberalization dates from Borgatti (2003); Export growth and duty: author’s own estimations. 
Table 1B 
Import growth and duty change before and after liberalization episodes  
  Liberalization:  Before liberalization  After liberalization 
Country  1st attempt  Episodes  Import growth  Import duty Import growth  Import duty
            
Bangladesh 1986  1992-present 9.39 33.46   8.70  15.01 
Benin 1988  1990-94  6.16 51.14   3.80  0.0 
Burundi 2002  2002  present 5.14 22.00    13.23  8.19 
Gambia, The  1985  1985-88 2.79  69.09    2.34  65.91 
Guinea 1986  1985-87  –  –    2.74  21.44 
Lesotho 1984 1994-99  11.62 72.07    -1.30  0.0 
Madagascar 1988  1988-96  0.84  36.37    7.29  46.54 
Malawi 1988  1997-2001  2.48  23.05    2.53 13.54 
Mauritania 1992  1992-97 7.74  35.33    2.73  0.0 
Mozambique 1987  1992-93  -6.14  –    4.75  0.0 
Nepal 1986  1986-92  9.27  35.17    7.54  31.27 
Senegal 1986 1994-present 2.40 39.73   2.77  0.0 
Sudan 1992  1996-2000  2.45 42.08   0.15  21.34 
Tanzania 1984  1990-present –  13.09    -0.50  0.0 
Togo 1988  1988-96  8.14 28.68   0.19  0.0 
Uganda 1981  1991-96  3.63 12.89    10.74  32.07 
Zambia 1982  1992-95  -1.33 10.68    3.45  0.0 
Source:   Liberalization dates from Borgatti (2003); Import growth and duty: author’s own estimations.   5
Table 2 
Average tariffs in LDCs (1997 and 2000) 
 Average  tariff 
Country 1997  2000  %  change 
      
Bangladesh 26.0  26.4  1.54 
Benin 14.0  14.6  4.29 
Bhutan 15.3  15.4  0.65 
Burkina Faso  32.1  14.6  -54.52 
Burundi 41.0  35.0  -14.63 
Cambodia 18.0  16.5  -8.33 
Ethiopia 24.3  18.9  -22.22 
Gambia, The  13.7  11.8  -13.87 
Guinea 15.0  16.9  12.67 
Lesotho 15.1  6.4  -57.62 
Madagascar 18.0  19.2  6.67 
Malawi 25.3  13.6  -46.25 
Maldives 22.0  20.0  -9.09 
Mali 23.1  14.6  -36.80 
Mauritania 19.0 14.0 -26.32 
Mozambique 15.6  13.8  -11.54 
Nepal 17.3  13.3  -23.12 
Senegal 29.0  14.6  -49.66 
Solomon Islands  45.0  22.7  -49.56 
Tanzania 21.8  14.3  -34.40 
Togo 16.3  14.6  -10.43 
Uganda 13.2  14.9  12.88 
Yemen, Republic of  12.9  12.6  -2.33 
Zambia 18.6  13.4  -27.96 
Source:  Direct country communications and author’s own calculations. 
Export promotion strategies have been put in place. These include duty drawback 
schemes, tax rebates and exemptions, financial support to exporters, establishment of 
export promotion agencies, and bilateral and regional trade agreements. Although there 
has not been an uniform exchange rate policy amongst LDCs, there is a variety of 
exchange rate regimes such as monetary unions (WAEMU, including Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger Senegal, and Togo), basket peg (Bangladesh and 
Solomon Islands), fixed peg to one currency (Bhutan, Cambodia, Comoros, Lesotho, 
and Maldives), floating rates (The Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Yemen and Zambia), and managed float (Ethiopia, Lao and Mauritania). Table 
A1 details the specific reform policies carried out by the countries under analysis. 
Foreign exchange regimes deregulation has also been important in reforming trade 
regimes.  
These policy changes are also evident in international rankings of trade policy regimes 
such as the IMF (1998) and the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (see 
Johnson, Kirkpatrick and Homes 1998; O’Driscoll et al. 1999), which classify many of 
those economies as possessing low-to-moderate trade policy regimes.   6
However, as Morrissey’s (2002) review of trade policy reforms in twelve SSA countries 
indicates, the success in various efforts in this direction has been mixed. While some 
countries made significant progress in liberalizing trade, rationalizing tariff structures 
and removing export bias associated with exchange rates and other restrictions, others 
have been slow and partial in the implementation of reforms. Moreover, where reforms 
have been implemented, their effects are difficult to isolate from those of other factors, 
positive or negative, affecting tradables (e.g., price and non-price incentives). 
Moreover, in the case of Africa, Dean, Desai and Riedel (1994: 14-8) show that most of 
the countries had very restrictive trade regimes to start with (both in terms of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers). In fact, many of the countries undertook trade liberalization in the 
early 1980s after suffering the adverse effects of commodity price fluctuations. 
However, in some instances the reform process was reversed (e.g., Zambia) or slowed 
(e.g., Malawi), which imposes th problem of credibility and sustainability. The main 
reasons for such setbacks in most LDCs were political, namely the needed government 
commitments, and the lack of institutional resources to accomplish the reforms. 
Additionally, African countries suffer from natural barriers, which are often 
understated, but which affect the effectiveness of policy reform. The impact of trade 
liberalization on government revenues also hindered the reform efforts, in stances where 
some countries failed to adopt alternative tax reforms as, for example, the introduction 
of indirect taxes, to compensate for the loss of government revenue.  
3  Trade liberalization, exports and imports 
3.1 Empirical  specification 
The paper proceeds to investigate the impact of trade liberalization on export 
performance. To that end the exercise employs an export growth equation, capturing a 
mixture of demand-side and supply-side influences.11 Export growth is expected to 
respond positively to world income growth and negatively to the real exchange rate 
measured in such a way as to reflect international competitiveness. A modified standard 
export growth, incorporating lagged adjustment (t – 1), may be written as: 
01 2 3 1 it it it it t xp x w y x ββ β β μ − =+ + + +    (1) 
where it are the country- and time-specific effects for the panel data estimator, px is the 
rate of change of the RER; β1 = η and β2 = ε are the short run price and income 
elasticities, respectively, and μt is the error term. The long-run price and income 
elasticities are given by β1/(1 – β3) and β2/(1 – β3), respectively. 
Within this framework (which controls for demand side variables), there are several 
channels through which trade liberalization can affect export growth. Two measures of 
liberalization are included. First, the ratio of export duties to total exports (dt) is taken as 
                                                 
11 Export demand analysis has been applied to both industrial and developing countries. Goldstein and 
Khan (1985) survey the literature related to income and price effects in foreign trade, and Senhadji 
and Montenegro (1999) for an assessment of export demand equations. Greenaway and Sapsford 
(1994), Shafaeddin (1994), Ahmed (2000) and Santos-Paulino (2002b) analyse export responses to 
trade liberalization in developing and least developed countries.   7
a major indicator of the degree of distortion or anti-export bias in an economy. The 
selection of this variable is based on the fact that export duties represent one of the most 
widely used policy instruments in the countries analysed, and can be easily measured. A 
reduction in the ratio is expected to raise export growth for any given change in world 
income growth and the real exchange rate. Second, a liberalization indicator (libt), 
defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of zero before the year of liberalization 
and 1 afterwards (see Table 1A for the particular years of reform in each country). To 
the extent that liberalization reduces anti-export bias, there will be shifts in both the 
quantity and quality of resources into the export sector, which may also be expected to 
improve export performance for any given growth of world income and the real 
exchange rate. 
Trade liberalization can also affect the price and income elasticities of demand directly. 
Such interaction effects between liberalization and the price and income elasticities can 
be estimated by including two slope dummy variables in the estimating equation, 
wy×libt and px×libt. Taking account of these liberalization effects gives an augmented 
export growth function of the form: 
() () t it it it it it it i it lib wy lib px lib d x wy px x μ β β β β β β β α + × + × + + + + + + = − 7 6 5 4 1 3 2 1  
where αi captures country specific effects, and the expected signs of the coefficients are: 
12  3 456 7 < 0,  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, and  0 βββ βββ β >> <>< > . 
In modelling the effect of trade liberalization on import growth, the study estimates 
dynamic import demand functions relating import flows to relative price and domestic 
incomes.12  
Another crucial issue for LDCs is the contribution of capital inflows, mainly in the form 
of aid, as was stated at the outset. The augmented import growth function, which 
accounts for the effects of trade liberalization and capital inflows, can be expressed as: 
it it 6 it 5 it 4 1 t 3 it 2 it 1 i it aid lib d m y pm m ε β β β β β β α + + + + + + + = −    (3) 
Where αi are country-specific effects; pm is the growth in relative prices; y is the growth 
in domestic (real) income; dit is import duties; libit is a shift dummy variable for the 
years following significant liberalization; aid is the aid variable (where aid is measured 
as a ratio of nominal GDP); and εit the error term. The rest of the variables are as 
defined earlier, and we expect  12 3 45 6 0, 0,0 1, 0, 0 and  ββ βββ β <>< <<>  to be 
determined. The detailed description of the variables is provided in the Appendix. 
The slope dummy variables y×lib and pm×lib are also incorporated to capture the joint 
effects of the elimination of import distortion measures on income and price elasticities, 
respectively. The assumption is that trade liberalization has a significant impact not only 
on the autonomous growth of imports, but on their sensitivity to income and price 
                                                 
12   Other relevant studies on import demand and trade liberalization for developing countries include 
Boylan and Cuddy (1987); Mah (1999); Bertola and Faini (1991); Faini, Pritchett and Clavijo (1992), 
and Santos-Paulino (2002a).  
(2)   8
variations as well.13 Also, given the conditionality attached to financial assistance, 
which is highly dependent on the outcomes of policy reform, a slope dummy is also 
included to assess the direct impact of trade reforms on aid inflows as a share of GDP. 
Thus, the equation to be estimated is: 
it it it t y it i it aid lib d m pm m
it 6 5 4 1 3 2 1 β β β β β β α + + + + + + = −  
  it it it lib aid lib y lib pm ε β β β + × + × + × + ) ( ) ( ) ( 9 8 7    (4) 
3.2  Panel data analysis and results 
To test for the effects of trade liberalization on export growth, the relationships are 
estimated by the dynamic panel data model based on generalized methods of moments 
(GMM). The GMM controls for the endogeneity of other explanatory variables, and the 
instruments used are based on lagged values of the explanatory variables (Arellano 
1993; Arellano and Bond 1998; Wooldridge 2001).  
The results in Table 3 show that the price and income elasticities of exports are 
significant, but the price elasticity is very low. Low price elasticities, which do not 
comply with the ‘small country’ assumption of trade theory, are frequently found also in 
time series estimates (see Senhadji and Montenegro 1999; Perraton 2003); and there is 
not much difference between the short- and long-run elasticities. The impact of 
liberalization is positive and significant, and the effect of the removal of export duties is 
also significant in most cases. The slope variable suggests that export growth becomes 
more responsive to world income growth as liberalization takes place. The slope 
dummy (px×lib) coefficient, although relatively small, indicates that the liberalization 
episode might improve the sensitivity of export performance to relative prices. 
To look more closely at the impact of trade liberalization, a set of impulse dummies is 
included, where the liberalization indicator (d1) indicates the impact of trade reform on 
export growth in the first year only, instead of an average post reform effect. The other 
impulse dummies (d2 and d3) pick up the impact of liberalization in subsequent years. 
The results reveal a relatively smaller lagged effect of trade liberalization on export 




                                                 
13  Melo and Vogt (1984) propose two hypotheses in this regard, which they tested for the case of 
Venezuela. First, they suggest that as the degree of import liberalization increases, the income 
elasticity of demand increases. Second, as economic development proceeds, the price elasticity of 
import demand also rises as the ability to substitute domestic production for imports becomes easier. 
14 A similar approach is undertaken by Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (2002) to analyse the 
relationship between trade liberalization and GDP growth in developing countries. Using a panel data 
analysis, and a set of different liberalization indicators, it is observed that liberalization does appear to 
have an impact on growth, albeit with a ‘J-curve’ type response.    9
Table 3 
Trade liberalization impact on exports and imports (1970-2001) 
Explanatory variables  Export growth (xt)    Import growth (mt) 
 (i)  (ii)    (iii)  (iv) 
        



































































Long-run income elasticity  1.85 1.77  1.95 1.91 
Long-run price elasticity  -0.003 -0.18  -0.13  -0.13 
 Diagnostic  statistics 
Omit wy×lib, y×lib 20.24**  25.51**    93.80**  25.20** 
Wald test  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Sargan test  [0.332]  [0.175]  [0.193]  [0.102] 
1st-order serial correlation  [0.040] [0.080]    [0.000] [0.000] 
2nd-order serial correlation  [0.179] [0.201]    [0.695] [0.513] 
Number of observations  545  545    545  545 
Notes: 
1.  Figures in parentheses (  ) are absolute t-ratios; figures in brackets [  ] are p-values. **, *, and ξ 
indicate that a coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
2. Omit  y × lib, pm × lib is the F-statistic for the omission of these two variables from the regression. 
3. The  Wald test is for the joint significance of the regressors. The Sargan test is of over-identifying 
restrictions, that is, for the validity of the set of instruments and is defined as Prob (
2
p J χ > ), where 
p is the number of over-identifying instruments. The tests for 1st and 2nd order of no serial 
correlation are asymptotically distributed as standard normal variables (see Arellano and Bond 
1998, 2001). The p-values report the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of serial 
correlation, where the first differencing will induce (MA1) serial correlation if the time-varying 
component of the error term in levels is a serially uncorrelated disturbance. 1st and 2nd order of 
no serial correlation tests are related to the lags of the instruments (i.e.,  1 t−  and  2 t− ), where the 
instruments are the lagged values of the explanatory variables and the lagged dependent 
variable.  
4.  The estimations were performed by using the DPD model developed by Arellano and Bond 
(2001) Ox version 3.00 (Windows) for PcGive (C). 
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As far as the liberalization-imports tie is concerned, income elasticities are statistically 
significant, whilst the price elasticities are very small and statistically insignificant. 
Import tariffs have a marginal significant and negative impact on imports. The 
independent impact of trade liberalization as exposed by the shift dummy coefficients is 
statistically significant. Also, the positive links between liberalization and income 
growth is confirmed (see Table 3).  
More interestingly, the lagged impact of trade liberalization is also apparent for imports. 
However, as in the case of exports, such an effect is relatively small if compare to the 
shift in the dependent variable as a result of liberalization. However, in the second and 
third years following the liberalization event, the direct impact of the reform increases.  
Table 4 
Trade liberalization and import performance: 1970-2001 
  Import growth (mt) 
Explanatory variables  (i)  (ii) 
    
















Liberalization (Shift), lib  1.87 
(5.94)** 
 




Liberalization (impulse d1)   1.09 
(3.47)** 
Liberalization (impulse d2)   0.04 
(6.34)** 
Liberalization (impulse d3)   0.01 
(6.14)** 












Long run-income elasticity  1.87 1.87 
Long run-price elasticity  -0.13 -0.13 
 Diagnostic  statistics 
Omit (aid × lib) 49.20**  74.81** 
Wald test  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Sargan test  [0.892]  [0.176] 
1st-order serial correlation  [0.020]  [0.000] 
2nd-order serial correlation  [0.770]  [0.757] 
Number of observations  545  545 
Notes:  See Table 3. 
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Table 4 incorporates the aid variables. The results corroborate previous findings. The 
statistically significant coefficients of the aid variable, which accounts for the official 
development assistance (ODA) and official aid received by the countries, confirm the 
positive impact of aid flows on imports. Also, the direct (and positive) impact of trade 
reforms on aid receipts is confirmed. However, this boost in import growth driven by 
the liberalization processes and the increase in capital inflows reinforce the concerns 
about the effect on the trade and current accounts of the balance of payments. These 
relationships would be assessed in the following section. 
4  Trade liberalization, the trade balance and the current account  
4.1  Empirical analysis specification  
The effect of trade liberalization on the trade balance and the balance of payments is 
theoretically ambiguous. This theoretical ambiguity is also present at the empirical 
level, as demonstrated and discussed by Ostry and Rose (1992); UNCTAD (1999) and 
Santos-Paulino (2005).  
In this study, the impact of liberalization on trade performance is measured in monetary 
terms because it is the nominal gap between imports and exports that measures a 
country’s shortage of foreign exchange, and how much countries need to borrow to 
sustain growth if liberalization worsens the payments position (Santos-Paulino and 
Thirlwall 2004). The effect of trade liberalization on the trade balance and the balance 
of payments is quantified by estimating two equations which control for income and 
relative price changes, and which also include a separate terms of trade variable, given 
that changes in the price of exports and imports automatically affect the monetary value 
of trade flows, independent of liberalization. With this procedure it is also possible to 
separate the nominal and real (volume) effects of price changes on trade flows.  
In order to investigate the impact of duty reductions and liberalization on the trade 
balance (TB) and the current account of the balance of payments (CA), both dependent 
variables are normalized by taking the trade balance and current account as a share of 
GDP. The equations are derived from standard export and import demand functions in 
which the growth of exports and of imports is a function of income and relative prices. 
As in the case of the import growth estimations, we include the aid inflows, measured 
by the official development assistance and aid receipts as a share of GDP. The basic 
estimating equations are: 
it GDP TB () TB 2 1 β β + = () () () it 5 it 4 it 3 p y w β β β + + +
() () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) it it it it it it it m it x lib aid aid lib y lib TOT d d ε + × β + β + × β + β + β + β + β + 12 11 10 9 8 7 6
 
and, 
2 1 it GDP CA β β + = () ( ) ( ) ( ) it 5 it 4 it 3 1 t p y w CA β β β + + + −
() () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) it it it it it it it m it x lib aid aid lib y lib TOT d d ε + × β + β + × β + β + β + β + β + 12 11 10 9 8 7 6
 
(6) 
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where  t1 TB −  and  t1 CA −  are lagged dependent variables; w is the growth of world 
income; y is the growth of domestic income; p is the rate of change of the real exchange 
rate; dx is export duties as a share of total exports; dm is import duties as a share of total 
imports; TOT the nominal (‘pure’) terms of trade, measured as the ratio of export to 
import prices; lib is a liberalization shift dummy; aid is the ratio of aid to GDP; and 
y×lib and aid×lib are the interaction (slope) dummy variables to take account of the 
impact that liberalization may have on growth and aid and, therefore, on the balance of 
payments. The expected signs of the coefficients are  2 0 β > ,  3 0 β > ,  () 4 0 β < , 
6 0 β < 7 0 β >  and  8 0 β > . The signs of the  ) ( 5 β p  lib( 9 β ), aid ( 11 β ) lib y× ( 10 β ) and 
aid×lib ( 12 β ) coefficients are to be determined.  
4.2  Estimations and results 
Tables 5 and 6 present the results concerning the impact of trade liberalization on the 
trade balance and the current account. All explanatory variables affect the trade balance 
in the expected fashion. Specifically, world income growth has a significant positive 
effect; domestic income growth has a significant negative effect; the trade balance is 
positively related to the real exchange rate (although the impact is minimal), and the 
pure terms of trade effect is negative.  
Reductions in export duties have significantly improved the trade balance, whereas a 
decline of import duties has deteriorated it. Furthermore, the process of trade 
liberalization seems to have worsened the trade balance. The findings also indicate that 
liberalization has improved growth performance, which has deteriorated the trade 
balance. Using a similar framework, Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004) analyse the 
influence of trade liberalization on exports, imports and the balance of payments for a 
sample of developing and LDCs that have also liberalized in the context of structural 
adjustment and/or multilateral trade commitments. Their results uphold the observation 
that liberalization has stimulated export growth, but has raised import growth by more, 
leading to a worsening of the balance of trade and the balance of payments. However 
the authors do not assess the impact of foreign capital or aid, or how financial inflows 
might be influenced by the liberalization process. 
The coefficients of the aid variable indicate that inflows are contributing to the 
financing of the trade deficits in our sample of countries. The impact of trade 
liberalization on the trade balance through aid is also positive and statistically 
significant. The impulse dummies confirm the ‘J-curve type’ effect of trade 
liberalization on the trade balance. 
Turning to the current account of the balance of payments shown in Table 6, the results 
relate to those of the trade balance, indicating that trade liberalization has also worsened 
the current account for our sample of countries. However, the marginal impacts of 
export and import duties on the current account balance are smaller than those of the 
policy reform. The current account balances comprise not only goods and services but 
also other current transactions such as interest payments and profit flows. However, 
these items have more to do with financial liberalization, and have no systematic 
relation with export and import behaviour. The coefficients of the aid variable and aid 
slope dummies are also statistically significant, confirming that capital inflows have   13
helped to fund the deficits generated by liberalization, and making it easier also to 
adjust the current account to a sustainable level. 
Table 5 
Trade liberalization and the trade balance, 1970-2001 
Explanatory variables  Dependent variable: trade balance/GDP (tb ) 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
      


























































































 Diagnostic  statistics 
      
Wald test  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Sargan test  [0.368]  [0.438] [0.853] [0.391] 
1st-order serial correlation  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2nd-order serial correlation  [0.249] [0.166] [0.248] [0.163] 
Number of observations  545  545  545  545 
Notes:  See Table 3. 
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Table 6 
Trade liberalization and the current account, 1970-2001 
Explanatory variables  Dependent variable: current account/GDP (ca) 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
      
























RER growth ( p )  -0.004 
(1.39)    -0.004 
(1.37)   





















(2.27)*    




































TOT     -0.02 
(2.70)*    -0.02 
(2.63)* 
 Diagnostic  statistics 
      
Wald test  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Sargan test  [0.189]  [0.282] [0.511] [0.285] 
1st-order serial correlation  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2nd-order serial correlation  [0.400] [0.200] [0.399] [0.199] 
Number of observations  545  545  545  545 
Notes:  See Table 3. 
4 Conclusion 
Overall, the paper’s findings have important policy implications, particularly the higher 
import growth in contrast with the more modest export growth following trade 
liberalization. It raises the issue of the sequencing of the liberalization of exports and 
imports, that is, import liberalization should be appropriately sequenced or combined   15
with effective measures designed to improve competitiveness and to promote exports. 
The lack of an appropriate combination of domestic policies and liberalization—both 
trade and financial—was one of the main factors behind the balance of payment crises 
affecting developing countries in the early 1980s, as Khan and Zahler (1985) note. 
Moreover, the fact that the impact of trade liberalization on import growth is higher than 
its effect on export growth implies that the shift to a liberalized trade regime exacerbates 
aid dependence and, to the extent that aid is not provided in grants and is not building 
up trade capacity, it has increased the likelihood of another debt crises in the future, as 
well as the problem of sustainable financing of the trade deficit. 
The financing and sustainability of the trade account deficit in the reforming countries 
will depend not only on the outcome of trade liberalization, but on other 
macroeconomic policies (particularly those that influence demand), developments in the 
real exchange rate and the inflows of foreign capital. With regard to the financing of the 
trade deficit, financial liberalization could be a vehicle to ensure such financing, 
because this would help to attract foreign capital in search of high returns, allowing 
them to increase their investment (in relation to savings) without running into payments 
constraints. Also, a higher flow of foreign direct investment would further accelerate 
growth not only by supplementing domestic resources for capital accumulation, but also 
through technological transfers and knowledge. 
The results concerning the current account effects of liberalization indicate that the 
countries under review have had difficulties in financing the foreign exchange 
consequences of trade policy reform, and have had to adjust their economies according 
to the level of sustainable capital inflows (e.g., foreign aid or official development 
assistance). On the other hand, the liberalization of the capital account, intended mostly 
to mobilize private external financing, could have also affected the management of 
foreign exchange and henceforth the overall payments positions of the countries. 
Instability in financial flows and the resulting misalignments and fluctuations of 
exchange rates worsen payments difficulties by discouraging investment in 
traded-goods industries. Thus, capital flows could widen the resource gap through their 
adverse effects on exchange rates, imports and exports, rather than being driven by the 
requirements of the current account.    16
Appendix: Data definitions and sources 
Aid (aid):   Official development assistance and official aid. Source: World Bank 
(2002). 
Aid (aid/GDP):   Official development assistance and official aid (current US$) as a 
share of nominal GDP. Source: World Bank (2002). 
Export growth (x): Exports of Goods and Services; annual percentage growth constant 
1995 US$). Source: World Bank (2002). 
Export duties (dx): Export duties (per cent of exports); includes all levies collected on 
goods at the point of export. Source: World Bank (2002). 
Import duties (dm): Import duties (per cent of imports). Import duties comprise all levies 
collected on goods at the point of entry into the country. They include 
levies for revenue purposes or import protection, whether on a 
specific or ad-valorem basis, providing they are restricted to imported 
products. Data are shown for central government only. Source: World 
Bank (2002). 
Rate of change of relative prices (px and pm) used in the export and import demand 








, where E is the nominal exchange rate measured as the 







 is the ratio of 
domestic to foreign prices. Source: World Bank (2002) and IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics (various issues).  
Import growth (m): Imports of Goods and Services; annual percentage growth (constant 
1995 US$). Source: World Bank (2002). 
Income growth (y): GDP; annual percentage growth (constant 1995 US$). Source: 
World Bank (2002).  
World income growth (w): World GDP; annual percentage growth (constant 1995 US$). 
Source: World Bank (2002). The activity variable is defined as the 
difference between world GDP and country GDP, that is: 
ii WY WorldGDP GDP =− . 
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Appendix Table A1 
Trade and exchange rate liberalization policies 
    
Bangladesh 1980  -  The Foreign Private Investment Act was adopted, containing 
provisions for non-discrimination of FDI against domestic investment. 
 1985-86  -  Implementation of a SAF programme, aimed at rationalizing tariffs 
and other import taxes, eliminating import prohibitions and other 
restrictions.  
 1991  -  Replacement of the positive lists of imports by a negative one. 
Incentives to support export promotion programmes such as bonded 
warehouse facilities and a duty drawback scheme were introduced 
 1991-92  -  A new industrial policy was adopted, aimed at promoting 
liberalization and private sector development. It also provided priority 
treatment for export-oriented industries. 
 1994  -  The tariff regime was rationalized and simplified: the number of 
bands was decreased from 15 to 5 and the maximum rate from 300 
to 37.5%. 
 1997-99  -  Tax incentives were introduced to attract FDI. The multiple sales tax 
was replaced by a 15% VAT levied on imports and domestically 
produced goods.  
-  The exchange rate was unified and the foreign account holdings 
liberalized. 
-  The taka became convertible internationally. 
-  Additional reductions of QRs and tariffs. Trade liberalization was 
continued. 
    
Benin 1991  -  The tariff reforms decreased the number of taxes levied on imports to 
two, and the range of duty rate contracted from 15 to 5. 
-  A VAT of 18% was introduced.  
 1994  -  Benin joined WAEMU.  
-  The tariffs on all products originated within the Community member 
states were eliminated and import tariffs with respect to non-WAEMU 
countries were reduced.  
-  The CFA franc was devalued against the French franc. 
    
Burundi 2002-03  -  Simplification of the import licensing process.  
-  The tariff scheme was simplified and the number of bands reduced to 
four. The maximum import tax rate was decreased. A simplification of 
the custom procedures was also undertaken.  
-  Exchange rate devaluation. 
    
Gambia 1985  -  The government strategy changed in favour of export-oriented type of 
policies. This had been preceded by a devaluation of the exchange 
rate.  
-  Abolition of licensing and quotas. 
 1998  -  The tariff scheme was simplified. Only four bands were used and the 
maximum rate was lowered to 18%. 
    
Guinea 1985-86  -  Progressive trade liberalization comprising the elimination of QRs on 
most products, and reduction of import duties. Export restrictions and 
licences were abolished on the majority of products. 
-  A monetary reform introduced a new currency.  
-  Elimination of State Marketing Boards. 
-  Price controls were gradually streamlined and only oil products were 
regulated. 
-  The Guinean Franc was launched. 
    Appendix Table A1 continues 
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Appendix Table A1 (con’t) 
Trade and exchange rate liberalization policies 
    
Guinea (con’t)  1991  -  An Enhanced SAP with the IMF was signed. Structural reforms re-
started.  
-  Tax advantages were given to exporting firms 
 1993  -  The banking sector was liberalized 
 1996  -  A VAT of 18% was levied on imports of local products.  
 1997  -  The exchange rate became market determined, and an inter-bank 
rate was created. 
    
Lesotho 1984  -  The Customs and Excise Act gave effect to tariff policy under the 
SACU agreement with common customs and excise duties on goods 
imported from third countries set by S. Africa as well as duty-free 
circulation of goods within SACU. 
 1988  -  A SAP was implemented. It included public sector reform, investment 
incentives and a reform in the tax system. 
 1994  -  Tariff efforts were accelerate by South Africa, consequently the 
average common tariff rate was reduced. Agricultural price controls 
were liberalized and state monopolies privatized. 
-  QRs were dismantled. 
 1995-96  -  The dual exchange rate system was abolished, and the privatization 
programme was launched. A sharp depreciation of the US dollar 
following the South African rand. 
 2000  -  The Trade Cooperation and Development Agreement was signed 
between SACU and the EU. SACU tariff rates rat o be reduced to half 
the bound rates over 8 years. 
 2001  -  Tariff reduction agreement between SACU and the US. 
    
Madagascar 1982  -  The economic reforms started to be implemented gradually.  
 1988  -  All non-tariff barriers were eliminated and replaced by ad-valorem 
rates. On the same year the Malagasy franc was devalued and then 
pegged to a currency basket. 
 1999  -  The tariff schedule was simplified and the number of bands 
decreased from six to four.  
-  The maximum rate decreased to 30%.  
-  With some exceptions, all export duties have been eliminated. 
    
Malawi 1988-89  -  An SAP was introduced, under which the tariff schedule was unified, 
and duty rates on imports started to be lowered. 
-  The exchange rate was devalued by 15% against the currency 
basket and exchange controls started to be relaxed.  
-  Export promotion activities were introduced, including tax allowance 
and duty drawback schemes, technical assistance and transport 
subsidies. 
 1991  -  The Investment Promotion Act was introduced to facilitate domestic 
and foreign investment (ratified in 1998). 
-  A negative list of imports requiring foreign exchange approval was 
introduced (and abolished in 1994). 
 1994-95  -  Export processing zones started to be developed. 
 1996-97  -  State-owned enterprises started to be privatized.  
-  Most non-tariff barriers were removed, including licensing 
requirements and quotas. The maximum rates were lowered to 35%, 
and tariffs on raw materials used in manufacturing eliminated. 
-  An integrated trade and industrial policy was adopted to stimulate the 
private sector, including the reduction of corporate taxes.  
-  Exports taxes and foreign exchange rationing were removed. 
    Appendix Table A1 continues 
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Appendix Table A1 (con’t) 
Trade and exchange rate liberalization policies 
    
Malawi (con’t)  2000-01  -  A Free Trade Area with other COMESA members was created. 
-  The Trade Protocol establishing SADC-free trade area was signed. 
Although most non-tariff measures were eliminated, new ad hoc 
measures were introduced. 
    
Mauritania 1992  -  Overall economic reforms and trade liberalization started. Reforms 
included prices liberalization, exchange rate liberalization, and 
privatization of state enterprises.  
-  Elimination of most non-tariff barriers and constraints on capital 
movements.  
 2000  -  The tariff rates were decreased and the schedule was rationalized.  
-  The number of rates decreased to four and the maximum duty 
reduced from 30 to 20%. 
    
Mozambique 1987  -  The Economic Rehabilitation Programme was introduced to start the 
liberalization of the economy.  
-  The privatization of the majority of state-owned enterprises was 
accomplished by 1999.  
 1990  -  The export promotion institute was created to sponsor exports. 
 1992  -  The majority of QRs and exchange controls were eased and/or 
eliminated. The tariff schedule was simplified and the number of 
bands reduced.  
-  Export registration requirements and licenses were removed.  
-  Foreign exchange controls were eliminated. 
 1999  -  A VAT of 17% was introduced, replacing the turnover and 
consumption taxes. Corporate and personal income taxes were 
reduced. 
-  The Mozambican Stock Exchange rate was created. 
-  All tariffs were bound to current rates. 
 2000-01  -  Preferential tariff treatment was granted to all members of SADC. 
-  The tariff structure was simplified once more, and the maximum rate 
was reduced from 30 to 25%. 
    
Nepal 1986  -  The launching of the SAP allowed for a large tariff structure 
rationalization as well as duty reductions.  
-  An import license auction system for the liberalization and facilitation 
of exports was introduced. 
-  QRs and import licenses were eliminated, and major market oriented 
policies were adopted.  
-  The new Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act and the 
Industrial Enterprises Act came into force, facilitating the creation of 
new enterprises. 
    
Senegal 1986  -  The long-term structural adjustment plan dictated a fall and a 
harmonization of the tariff rates. It also established the elimination of 
many non-tariff measures and import licensing. The agricultural 
sector was deregulated and the state enterprises started to be 
privatized.  
-  After the introduction of minimum customs tax assessments, a 
greater use of reference prices, and an increase in the custom duties, 
the effective rate of protection increased in 1989.  
 1994  -  The tariffs on all products originated within the Community member 
states were eliminated and import tariffs with respect to non-WAEMU 
countries were reduced. 
-  In the same year, the CFA franc was devalued against the French 
franc. 
    Appendix Table A1 continues 
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Appendix Table A1 (con’t) 
Trade and exchange rate liberalization policies 
    
Tanzania 1986  -  The Economic Recovery Programme of 1986 liberalized the 
exchange rate system and eliminate foreign exchange controls. 
Efforts were undertaken to decrease government control over the 
economy as well as to encourage private sector activities. 
-  The real exchange rate started to depreciate. 
 1999  -  The import duty reform simplified the tariff structure implementing a 
five-tier tariff structure. The highest tariff rate of 30% was eliminated. 
-  Export taxes were abolished. 
    
Togo 1988  -  The SAP included measures aimed at reforming the public sector, 
dismantling the majority of QRs, and eliminating the export licenses 
for the local industrial products.  
 1994  -  The tariffs on all products originated within the Community member 
states started to be eliminated and import tariffs with respect to non-
WAEMU countries were reduced.  
-  The CFA franc was devalued against the French franc. 
 1996  -  Import licenses as well as export monopolies of the base products 
were eliminated. 
    
Uganda 1987  -  The Economic Recovery Programme started the elimination of QRs 
and the liberalization of export monopolies. Import and export 
licenses were granted to private firms. 
-  The exchange rate was devalued by around 70% and the exchange 
rate regime was reformed. 
-  FDI started to be promoted. 
    
Zambia 1991-92  -  The adoption of the three-year SAP included the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises, the phasing out of non-tariff barriers and a 
simplification of the tariff regime (the tariff categories were reduced 
from 12 to 4) and planning for a gradual lowering of the tariff rates. 
Note:   COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa;  
  QRs: quantitative restrictions;  
  SACU: South African Currency Union;  
  SADC: Southern Africa Development Community; 
  SAF: Structural Adjustment Facility;  
  SAP: Structural Adjustment Programme;  
  VAT: value added tax;  
  WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union. 
Source:   Borgatti (2003); Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004), and WTO Trade Policy Review (various 
issues). 
 
   21
Appendix Table A2 
Initial overall rating and targeted change in trade policy restrictiveness rating 













       
LDCs         
Mozambique (1990) ESAF  10  -4 -1 -2  6 
Zimbabwe (1992) ESAF, EFF  10  -4 -1 -2  6 
Burkina Faso (1993) SAF  10  -3 -1  0  7 
Bangladesh (1990) ESAF  10  -2 -1  0  8 
Ethiopia (1992) SAF  10  -2 -1  0  8 
Burkina Faso* I (1991) ESAF  10  0 0 0  10 
Tanzania (1991) ESAF  9  -4 -1 -1  5 
Mauritania* (1992) ESAF  9  0 0 0 9 
Mali (1992) ESAF  8  -3 -1  0  5 
Lesotho* (1991) ESAF  8  0 0 0 8 
Nepal (1992) ESAF  7  -4 -1 -1  3 
Zambia (1992) ESAF  7  -3 -1  0  4 
Benin* (1993) ESAF  6  -3 -1  0  6 
       
Developing countries         
Comoros (1991) SAF  10  -2 -1  0  8 
Guyana (1990) ESAF  10  -2 0  -2 8 
Jordan* (1992) SB  10  0 0 0  10 
Panama* (1992) SB  8  -4 -1 -1  8 
Philippines* (1991) SB  8  0 0 0 8 
Sri Lanka (1991) ESAF  7  -5 -1 -2  2 
Equatorial Guinea (1993) ESAF  5  -2 0  -2 3 
Argentina (1992) EFF  5  0 0 0 4 
Sierra Leone (1992) ESAF  5  0 0 0 4 
Jamaica (1992) EFF  4  -1 0  -1 3 
Mongolia* (1993) ESAF  3  0 0 0 3 
Peru* (1993) EFF  3  0 0 0 3 
Notes:   Each programme’s effectiveness date is indicated in parenthesis. The classification scheme for 
Overall Trade Restrictiveness is a combined index, which includes tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
The index ranks from 1 to 10, where 1 is the more open category and 10 is considered as 
restrictive. EFF means extended fund facility; SAF: structural adjustment facility; ESAF: 
enhanced structural adjustment facility; SB: stand-by agreement.  
  * Indicates that the country did not change (i.e., reduced) trade policy restrictiveness from the 
initial to the final overall rating. 
Source:   Santos-Paulino (2005).   22
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